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Eating 
Meals have always been an important social ritual where people gather 
together and digest much more than food. Regular meals involve chewing 
over and swallowing ideas, discussing people and places, neighbourhood 
rumours and political conspiracies. Eating can be a vehicle for expressing 
affection towards family and friends, workplace loyalty, forbidden lust. 
Globalization has changed the meaning of meals. People from the 
countryside have moved to urban areas to survive. The traditional group 
has disappeared. For a time meals were reduced to no more than the 
swallowing of food, and eating became a time when people experienced 
loneliness. The birth of the fast food industries was a response to this 
"aura" of loneliness. The longer one took preparing, eating, and cleaning 
up, the more unbearable the loneliness. McDonalds and Dairy Queen offer 
relief by eliminating both the anticipation that the preparation of a "meal" 
involves, and the tragic afterglow of loneliness produced by post-meal 
dish-washing. 
It is no surprise that many people can be found in fast food restaurants: 
families with children in search of Disney products, students cramming for 
examinations, and vagabonds; they all spend time there. They do not need 
to communicate but can all exist together in a way that minimizes loneli- 
ness. There is no stress. But this is not "eating" in the traditional sense. 
What can we name this new concept? 
-Maki Yagi 
Ecology 
The Greek roots suggest that "eco-logy" refers to knowledge (logos) of 
the home or dwelling (oikos). Ecology, which emerged as a scientific dis- 
cipline in the latter half of the nineteenth century, is thus concerned with 
the relationship between organisms and their dwelling-place, or envi- 
ronment. One of its most important thematics has been an emphasis on 
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"interconnectedness"-perhaps best captured by the slogan "everything 
relates." "Environment" in this sense is a set of relations between various 
organisms and inorganic systems. The conceptualization of "environ- 
ment" as a set of relations and feedback mechanisms rather than an inert 
thing, has allowed ecologists to challenge some of the traditional dis- 
tinctions of conventional science, for example in James Lovelock's pro- 
vocative "Gaia Hypothesis," which suggests that the earth itself can be 
understood as a single, highly complex organism. 
In spite of its affinities with Darwinian evolutionary theory and its em- 
phasis on interconnectedness, however, it was only in the 1930s that eco- 
logical study began to include the study of Homo sapiens, and the relation 
of that particular species to its environment. But by the latter half of the 
twentieth century, the notion of a "human ecology" has become virtually 
impossible to avoid, as the globalization of the industrial revolution has 
resulted in a (human-induced) transformation of the global environment 
to an extent unprecedented since at  least the extinction of the dinosaurs. 
As the scope of this transformation was becoming evident, beginning in 
the 1960s, "ecology" received a political inflection, as the term more 
frequently referred specifically to the study of how human beings' inter- 
actions with their environment has resulted in the radical transformation 
of that environment. Moreover, the politics associated with ecology have 
generally been of a critical sort. As in the case of Rachel Carson's Silent 
Spring (a landmark study of the effects of human pesticide use) ecology 
has become concerned to  diagnose particular human ways of relating 
to the environment as being pathological. Ecology as a political term has 
thus sought to not only describe the relationship of a particular human 
community to its environment, but also to demonstrate the destructive 
character of that relationship, and to advocate political changes that 
would reduce the human impact on the environment. The "ecology move- 
ment," with an emphasis on reduced consumption or "voluntary sim- 
plicity" and other socio-political changes that might allow us to "get back 
to nature" (or live in a more "harmonious" relationship with our envi- 
ronment) thus became associated for many with the New Left politics of 
the 1960s. 
Another important step in the transition from ecology as a scientific 
discipline to ecology as a social movement was marked by Arne Naess' 
distinction between "shallow" and "deep" ecology. Naess' argument in 
favour of radicalism rather than reformism, sought to distinguish be- 
tween, on the one hand socio-political changes that simply allowed for the 
extension of current human modes of interacting with the environment 
(changes to allow for "sustainable development," for example), and on the 
other hand, more far-reaching changes that fundamentally alter the ways 
in which we interact with our environment (i.e. a rejection of "develop- 
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ment" as it is currently understood). For most "deep ecologists," this has 
meant a political program emphasizing a reduction in the human impact 
on the natural environment far more radical than those entailed in curb- 
side recycling projects. At its most radical, it involves a claim for "bio- 
centric equalityy'-that all life forms, human and non-human, are to be 
treated equally.' The implications of such anti-anthropocentric arguments 
are to treat human beings as a species that has a disproportionate (and 
largely negative) effect on its environment (the habitat of other species), 
and whose impact should therefore be reduced. Deep ecologists have 
argued for such a reduction through, for example, the development of 
"soft-path" technologies, preservation of wilderness areas on a large scale, 
banning or heavily restricting automobile use, and a drastic reduction in 
the human population, usually to be achieved gradually and consensually, 
but in some cases, by the extension of game management techniques to 
human populations.2 
The lurking possibility that solutions to the dilemmas of human ecology 
might require massive amounts of political coercion is one of the ways in 
which "deep ecology" has gradually become disarticulated from the poli- 
tics typically associated with the other social movements of the New Left 
such as feminism, movements associated with various racial and ethnic 
minorities, and even the peace movement. In particular, after the energy 
crisis of the 1970s, there was a sense that solving ecological problems 
might not be compatible with solving other social problems (such as dis- 
tributional inequality) and might even necessitate the curtailment of pre- 
viously acquired civil rights. Following the political path of least resistance 
typically meant that the "solution" of ecological problems would translate 
into unemployment for workers in heavy industry (who were more likely 
to be unionized and relatively highly paid) and the economic devastation 
of communities reliant on resource extraction industries. In a political 
environment increasingly characterized by discourses of scarcity ("jobs or 
the environment"), ecological exigencies were increasingly portrayed as 
being beyond the traditional political polarities of left and right. The once 
near-automatic equation of ecology with leftist politics simply no longer 
obtains: Earth First! founder Dave Foreman is a registered member of the 
(U.S.) Republican  part^.^ 
That the radicalism of deep ecology's biocentrism can more or less 
comfortably coexist with the thoroughly mainstream individualism of the 
Republican Party suggests that radical solutions to ecological problems 
might require a more sophisticated theorization of the social than the 
Social Darwinism provided by the application of the paradigm of wildlife 
management. Such a rethinking has been provided by at  least two rela- 
tively recent schools of ecological thought. Both social ecology (devel- 
oped primarily by Murray Bookchin) and eco-feminism (inaugurated by 
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Carolyn Merchant's landmark 1980 text, The Death of Nature: Women, 
Ecology and the Scientific Revolution) have sought to  increase the aware- 
ness of the ways in which human ecology (our interaction with our envi- 
ronment) is structured by social relations. Social ecology has argued that 
the domination of nature is rooted in social relations of domination, and 
that the solution to ecological crises would therefore require a dismantling 
of the hierarchical structures of capitalism and the modern bureaucratic 
state in favour of more decentralized, anarchical, "organic societies." 
While somewhat similar in structure to acephelous "primitive" commu- 
nities, "organic societies" would exist in a situation of "post-scarcity" 
that would be made possible by the adaptation of advanced technology to 
more rational, humane and ecologically sound ends.4 Eco-feminism, on 
the other hand, has argued more specifically that there is a connection 
between the domination of nature and the domination of women in patri- 
archal societies (where women are identified as being "closer to nature"). 
It is a matter of some debate among eco-feminists as to whether the iden- 
tification of women and nature is itself "natural" (a result of female biol- 
ogy) or is an ideological strategy to further female subordination within 
society. In the former case, the solution to ecological crises would be to 
achieve a "transvaluation of values" by "feminizing" social structures and 
ways of knowing nature, for example by implementing a more "nurtur- 
ing" attitude, rather than the objective detachment of (male-dominated) 
science. If the identification of women and nature is itself socially con- 
structed, on the other hand, then ecological crises cannot be resolved by 
appeal to some essential feminine principle, but rather can only be re- 
solved (as in social ecology) by demystifying essentialized gender charac- 
teristics (both female and male) as the result of social structures rooted in 
domination. 
Both the latter version of eco-feminism and social ecology are thus 
indebted to the Frankfurt School and their critique of instrumental reason 
which connects the domination of external nature with the domination 
of internal (human) nature. What the Frankfurt School-inspired forms 
of ecology suggest, in other words, is that the shortcomings of deep ecol- 
ogy are best addressed by further application of the fundamental tenets 
of ecology itself: if it is true that "everything relates," then the structure 
of social relations must be considered relevant to the pathologies of "envi- 
ronmental" crises. Given that the twentieth century has been witness to 
a massive trend of urbanization, this has meant that some of the most 
innovative recent "ecological" studies have been those that have been will- 
ing to see the object of ecology as diametrically opposed to what it was a 
century ago. Rather than the study of wilderness environments-natural 
environments that excluded human beings- "ecological" writers such 
as Mike Davis, David Harvey, and Andrew Ross have turned ecologists' 
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attention to cities, which have increasingly become human beings' "nat- 
ural" environment. 
Notes 
1 The term "b~ocentr~sm" IS derlved from the wr~tlngs of Aldo Leopold. 
2 T~mothy W. Luke, Ecocntique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy and Culture 
(M~nneapolis: Un~vers~ty of M~nnesota Press, 1997), 33. 
3 Charles Bowden, "Dave Foreman!" Buzzworm 2 ,2  (March-Apr~l 1990), 46. 
4 See especially Murray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchtsm (San Francisco: Ramparts 
Press, 1971). 
-Andrew Biro 




a.k.a. The End 
ant. the day after, Genesis, big bang. syn. the abyss, Armageddon, the 
Apocalypse. 
By far, one of the most pervasive, and often annoying, aspects of the immi- 
nent twenty-first century AD is the public discourse on "The End," "end- 
times," or any of the other various ways of expressing the more terminal 
aspects of contemporary life. The Millennia1 crisis-as exemplified by 
everything from Chris Carter's television series The X-Files and Millen- 
nium, to Y2K paranoia, to the popularity of films such as Deep Impact 
(1998) and Armageddon (1998), to changing weather patterns as portents 
of the Apocalypse-point to the necessity for the overproduction of tran- 
scendental answers to the complexity of questions raised by the seemingly 
abysmal geopolitical, cultural and social climate of late twentieth-century 
culture. When, as recently as the late 1980s, postmodernism could be seen 
proselytizing the end of both history and "the real," thereby allowing for, 
in its weaker and more lackadaisical formations, a pervasive relativism 
which diminished both the possibility of political intervention in the pub- 
lic sphere and the ability for anything to actually convey meaning, the 
pesky presence of AD 2000 has, to some extent, inverted these dubious 
aspects of postmodernist doctrine. This has been accomplished by uniting 
a theoretical premise-which can be understood as one which postulates 
that the paradoxical tension between disintegration and globalisation, 
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circa 1999, point to the explosion of a critical mass within First, Second, 
and Third World existence-with a quasi-theological justification ("God 
foresaw this"), culminating in an irrational, but seemingly justified, belief 
in the termination of culture, history and the world. This smorgasbord 
of cultural phenomena is united with what can be only described as a 
Quaalude-like acceptance of it all: "It's the end of the world as we know 
it, and I feel fine." This theoretical development in late twentieth-century 
culture can be conceptualised thusly: it represents a shift from the post- 
modernist position of believing nothing means anything to the Apocalyp- 
tic view of believing everything has to mean something, even if one has no 
idea what that might be. Or, as Canada's The Five Man Electrical Band 
put it quite succinctly in 1971, in another context entirely: "Sign, sign, 
everywhere a sign / blocking out the scenery / breaking my mind. / Do this, 
don't do that / Can't you read the sign?" 
If modernism implies - and some would argue, includes -postmod- 
ernism within its own historical trajectory, then postmodernism does this 
also with regard to "The End," as it is the only thing which can logically 
exist after the "post." While "The End" supersedes postmodernism-and, 
in the theological sense, supersedes everything-it is still a premise built 
upon irrational anxiety and not critical reflection. What's more, there 
is no exterior vantage-point left from which to critique the postulation 
of "The End"; everything from Mark Kingwell's cultural anthropology of 
the Millennia1 crisis, to Stephen J. Gould's attempt at a rational, quasi-sci- 
entific deconstruction of the phenomena, to Jean Baudrillard's nihilistic- 
yet-ironic surrender to it all, simply feed the hyperbolic discursive activity 
which surrounds the fin du millbnnium. Yet attacking the esprit de corps 
which surrounds the burgeoning Millennial cultural, religious and theo- 
retical bandwagons begs a serious question which will not go away: why is 
the production of "end-times" so prevalent? Is AD 2000 simply an excuse 
for a global excursion into the carnivalesque, or is there something more 
portentous about it? 
To address this issue, we must go back through the looking glass of cul- 
tural history. The end, like all things, has a beginning. I can cite two begin- 
nings, in fact, although there are most probably a multitude of others. 
Indeed, we can all pick our favourites or the ones which seem the most 
portentous, as the global village can't have a Millennial crisis or "end- 
times" without signs which read, for those of us who wish to see, that 
"The End is nigh." So, here are my two signs of the Apocalypse: the first is 
the 1967 release of The Doors' first album (a band which, along with The 
Velvet Underground, embodies the Apocalyptic underside of the spirit of 
the 1960s) which ends, appropriately enough, with The End. The second 
is in 1968, and the release of Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey, 
a film which postulates a new beginning after the end; that is with the 
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dawning of the new millennium. In this new age, humans are swept off the 
earth not to meet their maker (at least not in the theological sense) but to 
be-in a manner which would send most Baptists running into the arms 
of the Devil-born again. There is then a lull, and a sense of false security 
emerges. And then, as a sign-post for what's to come (a premonition, one 
might be tempted to say) Kubrick and Jim Morrison are united in the final 
scenes in Francis Ford Coppola's Apocalypse Now! (1978). Here, 'Nam 
and Napalm provide an allegorical image of the judgment day that's to 
come and again demonstrate that all the signs are there for those who wish 
to see them. The first death-throes of the 1960s-and of the century-dur- 
ing the Summer of Love in 1967 can therefore be seen as the birth of the 
Millennium's "end-times." Further, in the cases of both Kubrick and Cop- 
pola, the technology which Western culture fetishises-the technology 
which has defined the twentieth century as a radical paradigm shift from 
what had come before-leads to our ultimate demise. 
Now, I realise my own reading of signs is as arbitrary as those who 
really do predict the end is nigh; but that's part of the magic of the Mil- 
lennium. One can take a questionable premise and prove it through retro- 
active textual analysis; "God foresaw this" is the first, although by no 
means last, example of this form of theoretical justification. More seri- 
ously, all of the above texts arise in relation to the utopianism of the late- 
1960s; and all three postulate the dialectical "other" of the Age of Aquar- 
ius: the looming dystopic disillusion which has historically always accom- 
panied the fin du sikcle and, a fortiori, the fin du mille'nnium. 
But "The End" also provides relief and reaffirmation, not only despair, 
destruction and death. Or rather, these quite nasty categories become 
comforting in times of need, as the Millennium seems to be. For instance, 
these are the "Yahoo!" subject headings found during a Web search for 
"Millennium": "Full Coverage > World > Millennium"; "Society and Cul- 
ture > Holidays and Observances > Year 2000"; "Business and Economy 
> Companies > Gifts and Occasions > Holidays and Observances > Year 
2000"; "Science > Alternative > Paranormal Phenomena > Millennial- 
ism"; "Science > Measurements and Units > Time > Actual Start of the 
Third Millennium" and; "Net Events z Computers and Internet z Year 
2000 Problem." These subject headings point to the fact that the Millen- 
nium can and is all things to all people; like Baudrillard's simulacra, it is 
all-encompassing, inescapable. There is no aspect of the human or social 
sciences that cannot be subsumed into the above categories; no aspect of 
the public or private spheres are left untouched. Indeed, the first category 
("Full Coverage > World > Millennium") pretty much covers everything, 
like all good quasi-theological Apocalypses should. Yet in spite of this, or 
perhaps because of it, "The End" gives contemporary western culture 
hope: in a time of rampant instability, closure becomes equated with 
l 
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meaning. And like Fox Mulder's conspiracy theories, the brilliance and the 
power of the Millennium crisis as embodied by "The End" is that it sup- 
plies answers for everything by quite ingeniously postulating the end of 
everything. Or, to put it in far more prosaic and perhaps sarcastic terms, 
world hunger, cultural imperialism and chronic poverty aren't very daunt- 
ing problems if the planet itself ceases to exist. These answers-in both 
their serious and ironic forms-and their current popularity are essentially 
a means of avoiding the chaos that often engulfs daily life. The postulation 
of "The End" has often diverted media and public attention from the very 
real crises facing the planet on a daily basis and has instead turned cultural 
anxiety about the future into a parade of crystal gazers, false prophets and 
the continuous search for the best place where one can, on New Year's 
Eve, party like it's 1999. And all of the crises and anxieties of contempo- 
rary Western culture-which reflect a complex set of issues which cannot 
be avoided in the twenty-first century-are commented on the same way 
one might, with tongue firmly in cheek, report on the happenings at a Star 
Trek convention. By doing so, one elides addressing how these problems 
can be feasibly dealt with if the planet doesn't cease to be on 31 December 
1999. And while I'd be the last person who would want to be labeled as a 
false prophet, all this displacement activity does not bode well if my pre- 




Passage in fascination. 
-Ken Allan 
Eurocentrism 
An obscuring term, an obfuscating term. Europe itself is an ideological 
construct, a mythic, fictive construct. Other than an inscription of certain 
nations between the Ural Mountains and Atlantic Ocean, what is Europe? 
When does the term first appear? Christmas 800, Charlemagne, imperial 
coronation, Leo 111, two groups out of eight (Lamberts, Franks) imposing 
unity, Pope in trouble, just left town, you remember the story? Nephew of 
former Pope ran him out of town, Empress Irene just blinded Constantine 
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her son in Greek-speaking Christendom and, most importantly of course, 
the power of the Arab Caliphs. This story is all about otherness for it is the 
Arabs that call Europe into being. In the face of heterogeneity and territorial 
particularity, an elite attempts to impose unity on Europe, to make it syn- 
onymous with Christendom. The attempt fails. Forty-three years later parti- 
tion of three kingdoms. "Europe" first used as an adjective in 1458, Pious II, 
five years after Turkish takeover of Constantinople, Turkish menace again 
calls the idea of Europe as unity into question. Fails. Quick reformation, 
division of Christendom and subsumption under national governments. 
Hence, the grand Renaissance and Burckhardt's lovely characterization of 
a new individualism that would serve as a critique of all forms of collec- 
tivity: nationalities, political parties, races, and so on. And the stirrings of 
this notion of individuality which would become inseparable from democ- 
racy in subsequent decades. Napoleon, May 1804, puts a crown on his 
own head, to proclaim himself Emperor of France. Battles: Leipzig. Boom. 
Waterloo. Boom. Post-Napoleonic nationalism escalates. New tribalism 
hits Europe. Europe's fundamental conflicts, contradictions, heterogeneous 
clashes are all hidden and concealed by the term "Eurocentrism." 
What does this term really mean? Certain nations whose elites con- 
stituted centralized powers and imposed white supremacist practices on 
different parts of the world. Say it. Male supremacy within a certain group. 
Say it. It is a typically bureaucratic move to bring an ahistorical char- 
acterization into a very complex debate. We know what George Orwell 
said about the decay of language working in tandem with cultural chaos 
and cultural chaos precluding the empowerment of subaltern people, sub- 
jugated people. Not only that, but it also precludes the coalitions and 
alliances requisite for any serious talk about social change. Intellectual 
clarity goes hand in hand with a certain moral sensibility and political effi- 
cacy. The left is feeble and obfuscatory categories do not help things out. 
So what do we mean by "multiculturalism"? Europe is already multi- 
cultural, multinational, and so forth. Are we talking about certain other 
cultures that have been degraded by white supremacist practices? Say it. 
Europe does not have a monopoly on male supremacist practices; many 
cultures subsumed under multiculturalism have deeply embedded forms of 
gender and sexual oppression shaped by their own experiences-forms of 
domination that must not be concealed or hidden by bureaucratic terms. 
What else do we mean by multiculturalism? To be sure multiculturalism 
addresses the identity crisis experienced by those who do not see themselves 
represented in, for example, the educational systems in which they matricu- 
late. But what does seeing yourself signify? I teach in prisons-mainly black 
men and I ask them, "What does seeing yourself mean in terms of a Shake- 
speare versus an Ellison, or in terms of a Dante versus a Toni Morrison?" 
I ask that at the beginning of the course, and I ask it again at the end of the 
course. If they don't see themselves in Shakespeare by the end of the course, 
then I've failed. And if they only see themselves in Ellison, then I've also 
failed. Why? Because human histories are interconnected and interdepen- 
dent. Once you begin to differentiate and fragment identities, then ulti- 
mately I might not see myself in Toni Morrison because of gender barriers, 
or generation barriers, or because she is from Ohio and I am from Cali- 
fornia. And if I don't see myself in Toni Morrison I might as well drop dead 
because of the collective memory of what it is to be a person of African 
descent in the United States and what it is to be a human being who recog- 
nizes that a sense of history and struggle is inseparable from one's identity. 
Seeing yourself is a very delicate and difficult notion. If seeing yourself 
means that your identity has to be solely limited to a community which 
itself is constructed in the modern world-fluid, changing, and hybrid- 
then we are reinforcing a parochialism and provincialism that is danger- 
ous. We are actually disarming and disempowering those who need intel- 
lectual weaponry in the war they are waging. 
Persons who refuse to see themselves in products and instruments of other 
cultures criticize Charlie Parker for blowing a European instrument. And of 
course, Charlie Parker never gave a damn because he did what he wanted to 
do with the means available to him. He was after weaponry in order to fight 
off the absurdity of being black in the United States before World War I1 and 
thereafter. He is no less black or African American for using African poly- 
rhythm and European instruments. He is able to define himself through a 
variety of different cultural products: not only through the particular cul- 
tural community that shaped and moulded him, but also through the musics 
of Asia, Germany, Brazil, and Mexico. This does not mean that he is a "uni- 
versal man." It means that he is grounded, entrenched in the best of his tra- 
dition. In that sense, he embodies a notion of universality that runs counter 
to the Enlightenment belief that the particular can be supplanted by the uni- 
versal. Charlie says no, you have to go through it. This relation between uni- 
versalism and particularity is one with which we have to struggle in our 
reflections on Eurocentrism and multiculturalism. 
-Cornel West 
Excerpted from "Beyond Eurocentrism and Multiculturalism," Public 10: Love, 1994. 
Exile 
"Dearest You, 
An exile's drearnltrauma is that home is elsewhere. An artist exile's dream 
is that her audience is elsewhere. There is always this 'other' place to  
desire, to mirror your self-image, your fantasies, where you will 'belong.' 
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Yet one of the processes of colonization is to teach the colonized that they 
do not belong. The colonized deals with a perpetual embarrassment that 
she does not know what her nationality is.. . If the process of colonization 
constructs me, it also constructs 'me' as an exile whose subjectivity com- 
pulsively tricks me into believing that home is elsewhere, while simultane- 
ously being traumatized by the awareness that home is but an illusion." 
{You Ching] 
-Janine Marchessault 
Excerpted from "The Sublime Object of Home" in Felix: AJournal of Media Arts and 
Communication vol. 2 no. 1, 1995,56. 
Film 
A sheet of dirt covering a surface; twentieth-century art and entertainment. 
-Janine Marchessault 
Filth 
"One man found, aged 63,  living in his own filth.. ." 
"He peed in mason jars that he stored in the basement. Other times he 
used a litter box.. ." 
"The walls were literally crawling. The whole place was rat-, roach-, 
mice-, flea-infested. You name it.. ." 
It is with us from birth to death, regardless of age, race or class. Dirt, 
decay, trash, garbage, excrement-we are constantly generating it, remov- 
ing it, generating it, removing it. Filth is instrinsic to life itself. 
Freud theorized that the repulsion from feces is learned. At first "his 
majesty" the baby glories in shit, it is his special gift to his mother. Only 
later is shit detestable, only later does shitting become an activity to keep 
hidden. Even dogs seem to absorb our aversion-looking shyly over their 
shoulder as they poop on the public sidewalk. It is an awkward position, 
yet absolutely vital to maintaining the body's, and by extension, society's, 
integrity: the elimination of waste. 
The phenomenon is familiar to all modern urban societies: the trash 
house, the cat lady. And it is all too understandable, for the tide of trash is 
so enormous, the impulse to dissolve your aversion and sink into abjection 
seems so temptingly near. The amount of energy spent in constant vigi- 
lance is considerable. No wonder the sick, the old, the lazy, and those of us 
who just don't care, so quickly subcumb and begin to slowly accumlumate 
detritus. We cease to place distance between ourselves and filth, and in- 
stead come to live amongst it. We throw the trash in the basement instead 
of out in the alley and save our urine instead of flushing it away. 
